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Abstract  
 In 2010, 122 drone strikes occurred in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of 
Pakistan, resulting in 849 civilian and militant casualties. Although the Pakistani government 
did little to protest against the use of drones, Pakistani elite opinion was complex in its 
response to both America and drone strikes. This paper argues that drone strikes made 
Pakistan’s elite more critical of America and drones during this period, and that civilian 
casualties most strongly influenced these opinions. This paper analyzes the rhetoric used in 
hundreds of English and Urdu Pakistani newspaper articles in order to understand the 
sentiments of Pakistan’s elite societal members toward America and the drone program. This 
paper finds that due to several influential factors, particularly civilian casualties, both drone 
strikes in Pakistan as well as sentiments toward America were discussed in negative, positive, 
and neutral terms, resulting in a highly multifaceted understanding of Pakistani elite opinion.   
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Introduction 
Largely since the end of the Bush Administration in 2008, MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 
Reaper drones—types of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—have been increasingly used as 
a means of combating terrorism efforts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
of Pakistan, particularly North and South Waziristan. While several nations have denounced 
America’s use of drones in Pakistan, understanding the opinions of Pakistan’s elite members 
of society is vital, as these individuals play a crucial role in United States-Pakistan relations 
and may have a greater understanding of the drone issue than do other Pakistani civilians. By 
qualitatively analyzing newspaper articles and reviewing scholarly literature, I hope to 
determine how drone strikes in Pakistan in 2010—the year with the largest number of drone 
strikes—affected the opinions of Pakistan’s elite toward both drone strikes as well as 
America. Additionally, I will analyze the factors that influenced these opinions in order to 
demonstrate the complexity of these responses.  
In order to address these issues, this paper begins with my research question, followed 
by a literature review of anti-Americanism, the drone war, and past studies that analyzed 
Pakistani opinions of drones and America. I then present my hypotheses and methodology, 
followed by an explanation of the datasets and analyses of my findings. I conclude with my 
limitations and possible policy suggestions, as well as a summary of my findings. Ultimately, 
I argue that there are multiple factors that influence Pakistani elite opinion of America and 
drone strikes, and that these opinions are highly multifaceted.  
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Research Question 
In 2010, what were the reactions of Pakistan’s elite regarding U.S. drone strikes in 
Pakistan, and what were the most significant factors that influenced these responses? 
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Background and Literature 
The Drone War 
 On September 11, 2001, the political and legislative landscape of America 
dramatically changed. The attacks by Al-Qaeda on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
resulted in America embarking upon a mission to exterminate various terrorist organizations, 
particularly Al-Qaeda, leading to the creation of the “War on Terror.” In essence, the United 
States has sought to dismantle the operations of foreign terrorist organizations and political 
leaders or regimes supported by these organizations by utilizing various means, including, but 
not limited to, the military, diplomacy, law enforcement, economics, and the legal system.  
The primary focus of the war has been the elimination of Islamic terrorist 
organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, and thus Afghanistan has been a key 
battleground since 2001. With the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and the 
ongoing warfare with the United States, many militants escaped to the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, and thus Pakistan became even more 
involved in the War on Terror than it had been previously (maps of both Pakistan and FATA 
may be found in Appendix A). The growing number of Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants in 
FATA, coupled with the refusal by various Pakistani tribal leaders to hand the militants over 
to the Pakistani government (as well as the Pakistani government’s inability and possibly 
unwillingness to seek these militants out), allowed FATA to become a sort of safe haven for 
terrorists, prompting the United States to pursue a military campaign in FATA (Bergen and 
Tiedemann 2009). Due to the presence of these terrorists, as well as opposition to U.S. 
ground troops in Pakistan, the Bush administration launched its first drone strike in Pakistan 
on June 19, 2004, killing prominent Afghan Taliban leader Nek Muhammad Wazir (Bergen 
and Tiedemann 2009). The United States soon had to expand its focus, as 2007 saw foreign 
militants and embittered tribesmen banding together to form the terrorist group Tehrik-i-
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Taliban Pakistan (TTP), organized under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, whose 
operations continue to plague the citizens of Pakistan (Fair 2011). Unless it is specified 
otherwise, all mention of the Taliban in this thesis refers to the TTP and not to the Afghan 
Taliban.  
As the threat imposed by the TTP, Al-Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations 
operating within Pakistan has grown, so has the number of drone strikes in Pakistan. Within 
Pakistan, there is a heated debate regarding America’s use of drones: while some individuals 
support American drone strikes because they eliminate terrorist threats the Pakistani military 
has been unable to detain, others view the strikes as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty and 
drones as dangerous tools which harm civilians; still others may simultaneously hold all of 
these beliefs. These differences in opinions may be the result of multiple factors, including an 
individual’s socioeconomic status, education level, gender, and geographic location within 
Pakistan (Bergen and Tiedemann 2010, The Economist 2013, NPR 2013). One thing of 
particular interest to note is that several studies indicate that there are large swaths of the 
Pakistani population who do not even know about the drone program due to a lack of 
education, limited media access, and other factors (Fair, Kaltenthaler, and Miller 2013, Pew 
Research Center 2010, Stanford and NYU 2012). Furthermore, it is important to note the 
distinction between supporting the U.S. drone program and holding a positive attitude toward 
America. For instance, an individual may believe that the drone program is effectively killing 
terrorists, but they may also detest the United States for violating Pakistani sovereignty. 
Likewise, disapproval of the use of drones does not necessarily equate to anti-Americanism, 
as the next section will illustrate. 
Understanding Anti-Americanism in Pakistan 
Recent literature indicates that there are two main types of anti-Americanism: a hatred 
of America (what the United States is), and a hatred of American policies (what the United 
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States does), although the two have a close relationship and are often intertwined 
(Katzenstein and Keohane 2007). Hatred of America as a nation includes such things as a 
general resentment of American power, a disgust toward American culture, an overall distrust 
of the American government and its people, and a perception of America as “the enemy” 
(Chiozza 2009, Gould 2009, Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, Sciutto 2008). Conversely, 
those who are in opposition to America’s policies and global politics may feel threatened by 
America’s involvement in, as an example relevant to the content of this paper, Pakistani 
politics, such as America’s alliances with controversial government officials such as former 
Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf. America’s involvement in India-Pakistan relations is 
another example of a possible source of hostility toward America’s policies, as America’s use 
of drone strikes in Pakistan. Individuals who dislike U.S. policies may believe that the U.S. 
has violated Pakistani sovereignty over the course of history with harmful consequences, 
citing examples such as the pressure placed on Pakistan to join the “War on Terror” and the 
war’s subsequent effects on Pakistan’s economy, or the raid that killed Osama bin Laden 
(Chiozza 2009, Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, Sciutto 2008). Further issues may include the 
perceived abandonment of Pakistan by America after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
the 1980s and opposition to U.S. policies toward Pakistan’s nuclear program, as well as other 
factors.  
In discussing whether or not drone strikes fuel anti-Americanism within Pakistan, it 
may be revealed that certain demographic groups of the population dislike differing aspects 
of the United States and its government, and that there are other factors that have more 
influence on anti-Americanism than do drone strikes. These factors may include a fear for 
one’s own cultural identity in the face of an American cultural onslaught, a dislike of 
America’s other policies (those not related to the drone program) and America’s strained 
political relationship with Pakistan, negative representations of America in the media, anti-
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Israeli sentiments that are in opposition to America’s support for Israel, the beliefs of radical 
Islam, cultural biases against America, and certain controversial events such as the killing of 
Osama Bin Laden and the pardoning of Raymond Allen Davis (Chiozza 2009, Gould 2009, 
Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, Markey 2013, Mazzetti 2013, Sciutto 2008). However, 
studies have been conducted that indicate drone strikes are a highly influential factor on 
Pakistani opinions of America, and these are discussed in the following section.  
Pakistani Elite Opinion 
 Pakistan’s elite members of society are an amalgam of business, military, political, 
and religious leaders (Milam and Nelson 2013). These individuals represent the top ten 
percent of Pakistani society and the key determining factors for this echelon of society are 
literacy, level of education, wealth, and power. According to the CIA World Factbook, only 
57 percent of Pakistan’s population is literate (CIA 2014). While Urdu and English are the 
nation’s two official languages, only eight percent of the population speak Urdu and eight 
percent speak English; both of these languages are utilized mostly by Pakistani business 
leaders and government officials, so there is likely to be some overlap with the percentages 
(CIA 2014). Furthermore, only about six percent of the Pakistani population hold Bachelor’s 
Degrees, indicating that there are elites who are not as well-educated as their peers, yet it is 
still an important quality. (UNESCO 2009 p. 201) As approximately 26 percent of Pakistan’s 
national income goes to the top ten percent of Pakistani society, these individuals are also 
fairly wealthy (World Bank 2011). As one portion of Pakistan’s elite is political figures, there 
are many elite individuals who hold political traction and are able to influence policy 
decisions. Lastly, given that literacy and education rates for women are roughly half the rates 
for men and that the female workforce participation rate is only 24 percent, Pakistani elites 
also tend to be male (UNESCO 2009, p. 201, World Bank 2014) .  
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Previous studies have been conducted that examine Pakistani opinion of America and 
drone strikes, although these studies were not focused on 2010 alone. In one study, the 
researchers argued that the media content Pakistanis could access would be a key determinant 
of their opinions of drones (Fair, Kaltenthaler, and Miller 2014). This study looked at Urdu 
and English newspapers and found that English papers—read mostly by elites—were more 
likely to present arguments defending drone strikes, and thus readers of these newspapers 
were less critical of drones than were those who read the Urdu papers. This study also found 
that disliking America was positively correlated with disliking drone strikes, indicating there 
is a link between the two.  
 The literature makes evident the importance of other non-drone related events on 
United States-Pakistan relations. For example, the Raymond Davis affair and assassination of 
Osama Bin Laden in 2011 are two events referenced in the literature as causing hostility 
among all ranks of the Pakistani population toward America (Fair, Kaltenthaler, and Miller 
2014). The literature also suggest that one cause of Pakistani disapproval of drone strikes is 
the idea that drone strikes create more terrorists than they eliminate (Fair, Kaltenthaler, and 
Miller 2014). Other causes include the notion that the strikes are being carried out without the 
approval of Pakistan’s government—a violation of Pakistani sovereignty—and the general 
lack of information regarding who was targeted by a strike. Additionally, property damage 
and, in particular, civilian casualties are prominent factors that cause anti-Americanism and 
negative attitudes toward drones by all members of Pakistani society. However, proponents 
of drone strikes argue that the Pakistani military has not been successful in eliminating 
militants from the region, and drone strikes have effectively accomplished this over the past 
few years (Fair, Kaltenthaler, and Miller 2014). Thus, it can be argued that there is a need for 
America to continue drone strikes in Pakistan.  
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 Unlike the previously established literature, this thesis focuses specifically on the year 
2010 in order to provide a clear understanding of elite opinion during the time with the 
largest amount of drone activity. Furthermore, this paper illustrates the relationship between 
different influential factors and various responses toward two different subjects: America and 
drone strikes.  
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Hypotheses 
 As aforementioned, the purpose of this thesis is to determine how drone strikes in 
Pakistan affect the opinions of Pakistan’s elite members of society toward drone strikes and 
America, and what the relationship is between these responses and their underlying factors. 
While this paper presents a qualitative analysis of these factors and responses in order to 
understand the nuances of this topic, I have two hypotheses about what the data will reveal:  
Hypothesis 1: The majority of elite opinions regarding both drone strikes and America 
contain strong anti-American sentiments.  
 This hypothesis draws on the literature from the previous section and polling data that 
indicate Pakistanis have a very unfavorable view of America. A Pew Research Center poll 
conducted over the past 15 years demonstrates that since the drone program’s true beginning 
in 2008, favorable views of America have declined. In 2005, 27 percent of Pakistanis viewed 
America favorably; while 27 percent may not seem very large, 2010 only had 17 percent 
favorability, and favorability in 2011 had declined to 12 percent (Pew Research Center 2013). 
While there were other events occurring during this time that could have caused this decline 
in favorability, it is also highly likely that the “year of the drone” played a strong role.  
 This hypothesis relies on the two-pronged definition of anti-Americanism from the 
literature review, as it will only be supported if there is hatred for both America as well as its 
actions—in this instance, drone strikes. As the methodology will discuss, this thesis relies on 
coding Pakistani newspaper articles that mention drone strikes. One aspect of this is coding 
the articles for the sentiments elites express toward America and toward drone strikes—
thereby treating them as separate entities—on a scale from “strongly negative” to “strongly 
positive” responses. In order for this hypothesis to have merit, the data must reflect that the 
percentage of “strongly negative” articles outweighs the percentage of all the other responses 
for both opinions of America and opinions of drones.   
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Hypothesis 2: Civilian casualties will be the most prevalent influential factor on elite opinion. 
 In the extant literature, multiple factors are referenced as being causes for Pakistani 
discussion of drone strikes. As no comprehensive polling data exists that examines the role of 
each of these factors, this thesis uses a qualitative approach to present a textured 
understanding of how these factors interact with Pakistani elite opinion of drone strikes and 
America. However, in both the literature as well as some basic polling statistics, civilian 
casualties are the most-often mentioned reason as to why Pakistanis are vocal about drone 
strikes. One particular survey found that 95% of Pakistanis believe drone strikes kill too 
many innocent civilians (Pew Research Center 2010, Fair, Kaltenthaler, and Millerjan 2014). 
This same survey found that only 56% of Pakistanis believe drone strikes are being carried 
out without the consent of the Pakistani government, thereby implying that violation of 
Pakistani sovereignty may not be as great a concern to Pakistani citizens as is civilian deaths. 
Due to the fact that elite opinions may differ from the opinions of the total Pakistani 
population, this hypothesis aims to discover whether or not civilian casualties are also the 
strongest influential factor on elite opinions, but argues that they are the most predominant 
factor.  
 While this will be discussed more fully in the methodology, coding articles requires 
recording the influential factors mentioned in each article. As with Hypothesis 1, if the 
articles mention civilian casualties more than any other factor, this hypothesis will be better 
supported.  
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Methodology 
As previously stated, this research aims to outline the various reactions from elite 
members of Pakistani society regarding U.S. drone strikes and the United States itself in 
2010, as well as the most significant factors that influenced these responses. This thesis 
examines Pakistani newspaper articles published in 2010 that specifically mention drone 
strikes or U.S.-Pakistan relations; the selection of these articles as well as the year 2010 is 
discussed in greater detail in the section “Datasets and Data Selection.” The following is a 
discussion of the factors and responses I argue will be most prevalent in the data.  
Factors 
Based on the literature, I argue that there are seven key factors that influence elite 
reactions to a drone strike; the following is a list of the factors the literature repeatedly 
mention and thus appear to be the most significant in eliciting an elite response; however, 
there may be additional factors that, due to the frequency of their occurrence, may need to be 
later included, and my final data will reflect this.   
1. Civilian casualties 
 As noted in Hypothesis 2, I am arguing that the number of civilian casualties that 
occur as a result of a strike will be the most predominant factor. A high number of civilian 
casualties may generate a negative response from Pakistani elite, which would increase the 
frequency of this factor in newspaper coverage of drone strikes. As the precision of drone 
strikes has increased, however, the drone data may also show that civilian casualties have 
subsequently declined, which may make this factor occur at a diminishing rate over time. 
2. Militant casualties  
 The number of militants killed by a strike may also be a highly occurring factor. If a 
drone strike is successful in eliminating a high-ranking target or numerous targets, the elite 
response may be largely positive. However, if the strike’s target escapes, responses may be 
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increasingly negative. Due to the fact that newspapers are not usually aware of which terrorist 
organization is being targeted by a strike at the time of reporting the strike, this factor does 
not examine which terrorist group was targeted.  
3. Frequency  
 The rate at which drone strikes are occurring may prove to be a frequently listed 
factor in newspaper coverage. It is not unreasonable to assume that elite reactions will be 
more negative and possibly stronger if, for example, this is the fifth drone strike in three days 
as opposed to the first strike in two months.  
4. Location 
 The location targeted by the drone strike may prove to be of crucial importance. For 
instance, targeting a school or mosque may elicit a much more negative response than, say, 
targeting a field in a mostly unpopulated area.  
5. Local reactions 
 The responses by members of the local community or tribesmen to a drone strike may 
also prove to be one of the most significant factors. As Pakistan is a federal republic, its 
officials have a duty to address the concerns of Pakistani citizens. For example, if citizens are 
constantly fearful of circling drones and stage protests against America, officials will likely 
have at least some reaction to these protests.  
6. Violation of Pakistani sovereignty 
 This is a factor elites are likely more concerned about than are members of the 
common public, as elites have a greater understanding of the legal system and what 
constitutes the violation of a nation’s sovereignty. Drone strikes have been widely 
condemned by the international community and are viewed as illegal by many countries on 
the grounds that the Pakistani government has not given its consent for all strikes. Even if this 
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is not the case, many elites may still feel as though the United States is preventing Pakistan 
from being able to deal with the terrorists on its own terms.  
7. Diplomatic context 
 Surrounding events mostly unrelated to a particular drone strike may also taint the 
reactions by elites. For example, if economic relations are poor between the United States and 
Pakistan and then the U.S. authorizes a strike within Pakistan, elites may be more aggravated 
than they would be if tensions were less high. This is why constructing a chronology of U.S.-
Pakistan relations is of vital importance, and the development of this chronology is discussed 
in a later section of the methodology titled “Datasets and Data Selection.” 
Responses 
 This paper argues that elite opinions of drones and America are scaled. Furthermore, 
there is a difference between having an opinion about drones versus having an opinion about 
America. Table A below depicts the range of responses utilized in coding the articles. 
Table A. Pakistani Elite Opinion  
Pakistani Elite Opinions of the United States of America 
Strongly 
Negative 
Slightly 
Negative 
Neutral  Slightly 
Positive 
Strongly 
Positive 
Pakistani Elite Opinions of the American Drone Program in Pakistan  
Strongly 
Negative 
Slightly 
Negative 
Neutral  Slightly 
Positive 
Strongly 
Positive 
 
 These responses, discussed in greater detail below, will be determined by whether the 
article itself contains a particular tone or uses certain emotive words, or if the author 
describes elite opinions in any of the following ways.  
1. Strongly Negative 
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 Elite opinion is exceedingly critical of either America or of the drone program. 
Articles may contain a negative or even sarcastic tone, use a frequent amount of negative 
words, or may depict elites responding negatively. An example of this is the statement, 
“Drone strikes ruin civilian lives and the United States is an enemy to Pakistan.” The speaker 
uses words such as “ruin” and “enemy” to discuss drones and America, indicating strongly 
negative feelings toward these two entities.  
2. Slightly Negative 
 For an article to be coded as only slightly negative, the merits of the drone program or 
of America must be mentioned and discussed, but the majority of the article contains a 
negative tinge. The sentence, “Drone strikes are successfully killing militants, but are killing 
too many civilians to be justifiable,” is an example of a slightly negative response to drone 
strikes. 
3. Neutral 
 An article is considered to be neutral if two criteria are met: there is no conveyance of 
emotion by the author and there is no mention of an elite response. Since straight news 
articles may discuss elite reactions, this standard prevents the coding of all straight news 
articles as neutral. Neutral articles are those that contain statements such as, “A drone attack 
last night killed five militants and three civilians. Local tribesmen were later seen protesting 
in the streets against the attack.” While this statement allows for the coding of factors such as 
“militant casualties,” “civilian casualties,” and “local reactions,” the statement itself does not 
convey any particular emotion toward drone strikes and makes no mention of America.   
4. Slightly Positive 
 Similar to slightly negative, this category relies on the article or discussed reaction 
being mostly positive, but with some mention of the negative aspect(s) of either America or 
drones. Take, for instance, the following statement: “Although drone attacks result in some 
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civilian casualties, their effectiveness at killing militants outweighs this cost.” Drone attacks 
are noted as having some negative consequences, but are ultimately deemed to be an effective 
tool in combating terrorism.  
5. Strongly Positive   
 Strongly positive articles laud the United States or drones by using positive diction or 
tone. A strongly positive statement of America would be, for example, “A Pakistani 
government official emphasized that the United States is a friend to Pakistan, evidencing 
America’s recent assistance in the reconstruction of flood-affected areas.” The official uses 
the positive word “friend” to describe America, and also notes a positive action America has 
taken to help Pakistan.  
Datasets and Data Selection  
The datasets consist of two parallel chronologies: one records events regarding United 
States-Pakistan relations and other notable events in Pakistan, while the other chronicles 
responses to drone strikes and the factors that may have influenced these responses. A largely 
qualitative analysis of newspaper articles was utilized in order to construct these chronologies 
and to understand the relationship between the influential factors and the responses to drone 
strikes and their context within United States-Pakistan relations. Newspaper coverage was 
utilized instead of other forms of media for several reasons. Firstly, as I daily newspapers, I 
was able to go through them day-by-day to construct my chronologies. Additionally, the 
demographic group I examined consists of elite members of Pakistani society. As these are 
primarily the only two groups who are proficient in English and Urdu and read these papers, I 
limited my sources to just English and Urdu newspapers in order to improve the accuracy of 
my data in targeting their responses alone (CIA 2014, InterMedia 2010). Furthermore, it was 
simply easier to read and code a large amount of news articles than it was to code audio or 
video clips from television sources.  
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Multiple sources of data were utilized: Pakistani English and Urdu newspaper articles 
located in the World New Connection Database and articles from two English-language 
newspapers, The News International and The Nation. I collected articles using the World 
News Connection Database by entering the following search term: "drone" or "United States" 
or "America" or "USA," limiting the articles to just my time frame of 2010 (which is 
discussed later), and restricting the articles to be firstly about Pakistan and secondly to be 
from Pakistani newspapers. All of the articles had either been written in Urdu or English, and 
the Urdu articles had been translated into English.  
In addition to the World News Connection articles, articles from The News 
International and The Nation were used, as both of these newspapers have archived 
newspapers online within my time frame. For these newspapers, I went through them day-by-
day to code the relevant articles, but utilized the same search terms listed previously when 
looking for articles.  
The seven newspapers are all daily papers; Appendix B has a breakdown of each of 
the newspapers, listing information such as the newspapers’ political views and readership. 
The majority of these newspapers are considered to be fairly conservative papers; it was not 
possible to access the archived articles of more liberal Pakistani newspapers, and thus these 
liberal newspapers could not be included. This is an unfortunate limitation of my data, as the 
recorded elite responses may only reflect those with conservative beliefs (InterMedia 2010). 
My data was collected from what has been termed “the year of the drone”: January 1, 
2010 to December 31, 2010. 2010 had more drone strikes than any other year of the drone 
campaign—122 strikes—which is about one-third of the total number of drone attacks that 
have been launched—386 (National Security Program). In total, 572 articles were coded, 
using the time frame and search parameters to limit the number of articles.  
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This sample was derived by using drone data provided by the National Security 
Program at the New America Foundation (NAF). The Foundation’s dataset provides a 
comprehensive list of every recorded U.S. drone strike in Pakistan (by date), the location of 
each attack, an estimate of the casualties (militant, civilian, and/or unknown) from the attack, 
and which organization or individual was the target of the attack, if it is known. This data was 
collected using reports by major international wire services, leading regional newspapers, 
prominent South Asian and Middle Eastern TV networks, and Western media outlets 
(National Security Program). I opted to use the data provided by the New America 
Foundation rather than those provided by the United Nations or the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism because, as a report published by the Center for Naval Analyses demonstrates, the 
statistics collected by the NAF represent a median value between the other two sources 
(Lewis 2014).  
The following tables (B and C) are examples of each of the sets of data; the Appendix 
also contains a sample of the factors and responses dataset. This dataset includes additional 
information, such as an article’s URL, publishing newspaper, and date of publication, which 
has not been listed below in the interest of space.  
Table B. U.S.-Pakistan Relations and Other Notable Events Dataset Example 
Event Newspaper Date of Publication 
Afghan Taliban claim they will 
murder detained US officials if Dr. 
Aafia Siddiqui is not released. 
Nawa-e Waqt 2/5/2010 
 
 Aafia Siddiqui is a Pakistani woman who was found guilty by American courts of 
attempted murder (on behalf of Al-Qaeda). The case rallied Pakistanis together, resulting in 
protests against America for imprisoning her and attempts by the Pakistani government to 
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secure her release. In this instance, although United States officials were being threatened by 
the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani response to her conviction made this a notable event.   
Table C. Factors and Responses Dataset Example 
Summary of Article Elite Factor(s) Elite Response(s) 
One resolution passed at the 
Nazaria-i-Pakistan Conference 
urged Pakistan’s government to 
use dialogue instead of military 
action in FATA. Members of the 
Conference argued that the US is 
violating Pakistani airspace and its 
“regional supremacy” and strongly 
condemned the US verdict of the 
Siddiqui case.  
Violation of Pakistani 
sovereignty; diplomatic 
context  
Strongly negative US; 
strongly negative drones 
 
In this article, elites were noted to have been strongly critical of both the drone 
program and of the United States due to their belief that America violated Pakistan’s 
sovereignty and its airspace by carrying out a drone strike, coupled with their anger at 
America’s handling of Siddiqui’s case. This article not only indicates the impact a singular 
event can have on elite opinion, but also reiterates the importance of Siddiqui’s trial on 
United States-Pakistan relations. As Table C shows, articles were coded with mutliple 
factors, and the statistical analysis of these factors reflects this.   
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Breakdown of Data  
As previously stated, 572 articles were coded and utilized. The factors and responses 
dataset consisted of 463 articles, while the chronology relating to United States-Pakistan 
relations was comprised of 109 articles. The following chart, Figure 1, depicts how many 
articles were taken from each newspaper in total: 
Figure 1. Number of Articles per Newspaper 
 
86 articles were from the five newspapers in the World News Connection Database, 
and the remaining 486 articles were from The Nation and The News International. Figure 2 
below is a breakdown of the datasets that illustrates the number of articles used from each 
newspaper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 4 9
292
32
194
24
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
A
rt
ic
le
s
Newspaper
21 
 
Figure 2. Number of Articles per Newspaper by Dataset 
 
While there were not many articles related to U.S.-Pakistan relations in the five World 
News Connection Database newspapers, it was still useful to have those articles in order to 
compare which events were mentioned by multiple sources.   
Figure 3 depicts the percentages of articles pertaining to a specific type of elite. For 
example, a little more than one third of the articles contained opinions held by Pakistan’s 
political elite.  
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Figure 3. Pakistani Elite Presence in Newspapers 
 
As the chart demonstrates, political elites had the strongest presence in the articles, 
with the exception of the “unknown” elites. Articles that did not mention a specific person, 
were straight news stories, or were editorials written by individuals whose backgrounds could 
not be identified were classified as “unknown.” Although there was a lack of information 
surrounding these individuals, their views were analyzed in the findings in order to provide a 
comparison with the identified elites’ opinions.  
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Findings 
Factors and Responses  
The following is a detailed analysis of information gleaned from the factors and 
responses dataset. There are multiple charts that depict a wide array of information, such as 
the relationship between factors and responses, factors and certain elite groups, and responses 
toward America versus responses toward drones. The first graph shown below, Figure 4, 
illustrates Pakistani elite sentiments toward both America and drone strikes. 
Figure 4. Pakistani Elite Responses to America and to Drone Strikes
 
 Figure 4 demonstrates that there were some differences in opinions regarding the United 
States and the drone policy; as mentioned in the literature review, there is a difference 
between hating America and hating America’s actions. Some articles expressed the 
importance of forging a positive relationship with the United States on topics such as peace 
with India, yet simultaneously denounced the drone program or wished for drone technology 
to be transferred to the Pakistani military. Others were vehemently opposed to the drone 
program while silent about the United States and its role in the program. A comparison of the 
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responses toward America versus the responses toward drones was conducted and is 
discussed later in this section.  
 Interestingly, very few articles expressed exceedingly positive opinions of either drones 
or of America. However, there were more “strongly positive” opinions of America than there 
were of the drone program—approximately two percent more. This is largely due to the aid 
the United States sent in August of 2010 to assist flood victims, which is discussed further in 
the section titled “Diplomatic Context.”  
 There is a notably larger percentage of neutral opinions regarding America than regarding 
drones because while many articles may have specifically mentioned opinions about drone 
strikes, they may not have included opinions about America itself. While “slightly positive” 
sentiments were almost equal with regard to both America and drone strikes, there were 
roughly half as many “slightly positive” articles as there were “slightly negative” articles for 
both opinions of anti-Americanism. This indicates that although elites were weighing the 
positive and negative aspects of the drone program and of America, elites were more likely to 
conclude that the cons outweighed the pros.  
 Ultimately, Figure 4 strongly supports Hypothesis 1—that there would be 
overwhelmingly negative opinions of both America and drones. As Figure 4 shows, 
approximately 52 percent of the articles were extremely critical of the United States, and 
roughly 68 percent of the articles contained strongly negative opinions of drones. The basis 
for these negative opinions largely lies within the factors that were shown to be influential on 
elite opinion.  
 The following chart, Figure 5, illustrates the most prevalent factors contained in the 
articles. While all of the previously outlined factors are listed below, there are additional 
factors that proved to be just as, if not more, predominant than the aforementioned factors.   
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Figure 5. Influential Factors on Pakistani Elite Opinion 
 
 Figure 5 depicts the most prevalent factors in influencing elite opinion of both drones and 
America. As the graph shows, many of the initial seven factors I predicted to be influential 
were frequently mentioned in the articles. However, location and diplomatic context were 
two factors that were not particularly impactful. The lack of the latter articles conveys the 
idea that other matters pertaining to United States-Pakistan relations had little influence on 
individuals’ opinions of drone strikes, as these events did not necessarily affect the drone 
program. Due to the fact that drone strikes occur in rural areas and villages, significant 
buildings were rarely targeted by strikes. However, homes were often targeted, leading to 
extensive property damage that often forced civilians into destitution or toward life in refugee 
camps; thus, property damage became a recurring factor for which I had not previously 
accounted. 
 The concept that drone strikes fuel terrorism also became a prominent factor. As 
mentioned in the literature, this is the idea that drone strikes and terrorist attacks have a 
cyclical nature: as drone strikes kill civilians and disrupt daily life, individuals become 
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incensed and take up arms against America and Pakistan, often in the form of suicide attacks. 
Individuals who are already members of terrorist organizations may also view the drone 
strikes as further reason to increase the frequency of their attacks. Belief in this cycle may 
shed light on why the “militant casualties” factor was somewhat low; Pakistanis may simply 
not believe that drone strikes are effective. What is interesting here, however, is that these 
terrorist attacks mostly affect the Pakistani people as opposed to American civilians or 
military personnel in the area, and thus the significance of Pakistan’s involvement in the 
drone program is key.  
One of the things that became most apparent quite quickly was the fact that elite 
opinion was very different from Pakistani government action. While individual members of 
Pakistan’s Parliament may have, for instance, spoken out against the use of drones, Pakistan’s 
collective government frequently did nothing to prevent drone strikes from occurring. This 
led to an unexpected response that, while not directly about America, was so frequent it could 
not be ignored: a strongly negative opinion of Pakistan’s government due to its allowance of 
the drone program. Approximately 28 percent of the articles displayed anger or resentment 
toward Pakistan’s government for either tacitly allowing the drone strikes to continue to 
occur, colluding with America to carry out the strikes, lying to the Pakistani people about its 
involvement, or a combination of all three. Due to this hatred of the drone program and the 
Pakistani government’s role in the program, individuals had further reason to participate in 
terrorist attacks against Pakistan.  
 Militant casualties were mentioned in almost one quarter of the articles, indicating that 
there are those who acknowledge the success the drone program has had in targeting 
terrorists. However, the frequency with which drone strikes occur was discussed in about 
seven percent more articles, implying that although strikes may be effective, their direct, 
negative effect on civilian life is of greater importance. Surprisingly, however, local anger 
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and protests were not mentioned as frequently as other factors, indicating that elites are not 
particularly influenced by the opinions of those who are socially far removed from them.  
 The violation of Pakistani sovereignty was the second-most prominent factor. However, 
while many Pakistanis do believe that the United States carries out drone strikes without the 
consent of the Pakistani government, there are also those who hold a desire for Pakistani 
control over the drone program, rather than American control. Thus, violation of Pakistani 
sovereignty does not necessarily equate to a unanimous disapproval of the drone program.   
 Other factors that were occasionally mentioned include the psychological damage 
associated with drones, the belief that the drone program is a way to target Muslims, and the 
economic impact of drone strikes on Pakistani livelihoods. Additionally, some articles 
mentioned the idea that the drone program is extremely detrimental to the peace process 
between Pakistan and terrorist organizations in the region; this idea is closely linked to the 
concept of the drone-terrorist cycle. While individually these additional factors were not 
included in a large percentage of the articles coded, there was a wide variety of these factors, 
demonstrating the complexity of drone strikes. 
 As predicted, civilian casualties were the most commonly mentioned factor. This lends 
credence to Hypothesis 2, that civilian casualties are the most predominant influential factor 
on elite opinions. While the vast majority of articles specifically mentioned the high civilian 
casualty rate, the actual civilian casualty rate for 2010 was surprisingly low—only 1.88 
percent (National Security Program). The overestimation of civilian deaths may be due to 
misreporting by the Pakistani press in order to generate anger over the drone program or may 
simply be due to the difficulty in accurately counting civilian and militant deaths in the 
immediate aftermath of a strike. Whatever the reason, civilian deaths appear to be the most 
prevalent factor, and thus gaining Pakistani support for the drone program requires 
addressing this issue.  
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 The following two charts, Figures 6 and 7, examine the relationships between the 
influential factors and the elite responses; they are separated into two graphs to demonstrate 
the differences between opinions of drones and opinions of America.  
  Figure 6. Comparison of Factors and Responses (United States) 
 
 This graph presents a comparison of elite opinions regarding the United States with 
the factors that influenced these opinions. For example, the percentage of articles that 
expressed strongly negative opinions of America while also mentioning civilian casualties 
was 65.93 percent. Almost all of the factors had the strongest presence in strongly negative 
articles, with a few exceptions. “Militant casualties,” “location,” and “local reactions” were 
coded more often in neutral articles than in strongly negative articles. This result is likely due 
to these articles discussing drone strikes rather than the United States, and thus they would 
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have been coded as being neutral with regard to elite opinion of America. However, it is 
important to note that while the percentages of “strongly negative” and “neutral” articles 
were very similar for both “location” and “local reactions,” “militant casualties” had more 
articles associated with positive sentiments than with negative opinions. In fact, there were 
almost nine percent more positive articles than negative ones with regard to “militant 
casualties.” Articles that mentioned militant casualties were more likely than other articles to 
discuss the effectiveness of the drone program in targeting terrorists, and were therefore more 
likely to portray the United States in a positive light. The following graph, Figure 7, examines 
the relationship between factors and the elite responses toward drone strikes. 
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Figure 7. Comparison of Factors and Responses (Drones) 
 Just as in Figure 6, the majority of responses for each factor were strongly negative. 
However, certain factors received even larger concentrations of strongly negative responses, 
and overall the data suggest that the responses held toward drone strikes are more polar than 
the opinions of America, as there are far less neutral articles in Figure 7 than in Figure 6. 
Additionally, the number of “slightly negative” articles increased for all but two factors—
“Pakistani government” and “others”—which are two factors that experienced an increase in 
“strongly negative” opinions. Unlike with the data presented in Figure 6, Figure 7 illustrates 
that there are very few factors that are associated with positive opinions of drone strikes. 
While “militant casualties” was coded as “slightly positive” in an impressive 22.24 percent of 
the articles in which it appeared, there is a noticeably negative difference in the number of 
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“strongly positive” articles in which the factor occurred in comparison to Figure 6. On the 
whole, only “militant casualties” and “others” were coded in “strongly positive” articles with 
regard to opinions of drone strikes. The “others” found in “strongly positive” articles were 
mostly the same factor—the transference of drone technology to the Pakistani military. In 
these articles, drone technology was praised for its effectiveness, but there was a desire to 
have the technology be utilized by Pakistanis rather than Americans. In such an instance, the 
article was often coded as demonstrating a “strongly positive” opinion of drones, with the 
opinion of America varying depending on the article in question. In order to better understand 
the relationship between Pakistani elite opinion of America and elite opinion of drones, 
Figure 8 below provides comparisons of each response.   
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Figure 8. Comparison of Responses (Drones vs. America) 
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 In the table provided in Figure 8, opinions of drones are at the top and opinions of 
America are along the left side. This table depicts all of the possible combinations of elite 
responses to America and drones, even if some of those combinations were not found in the 
data. Given the previous support for Hypothesis 1 demonstrated by Figure 4, it is 
unsurprising that approximately 44 percent of the articles—the largest concentration by far—
were determined as being “strongly negative” with regard to both the United States and the 
drone program. Interestingly, a rather slim portion of the articles were coded as being 
“strongly positive” with regard to America and “strongly negative” with regard to drones. 
Although these articles accounted for less than one percent of the total number of articles, it 
is interesting that there were articles that expressed these opinions. These articles were 
largely related to the flood relief America sent in August of 2010; while elites may not have 
approved of the drone program, they were appreciative of the aid sent by America.  
Conversely, no articles expressed “strongly positive” sentiments toward America while also 
containing “strongly negative” opinions of the drone program. Also of interest is the roughly 
17 percent of articles coded as being “neutral” with regard to opinions of America yet 
“strongly negative” with regard to opinions of drones. In the majority of these instances, the 
article denounced the drone program specifically, yet made no mention of America itself. 
Many of these articles expressed the opinions of Pakistan’s political elite; the following 
graph, Figure 9, depicts the opinions held by each sect within Pakistan’s elite society toward 
drone strikes.    
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Figure 9. Pakistani Elite Opinion of Drones by Elite Group 
 
 Regardless of the category of elite, the predominant opinion of drones was “strongly 
negative.” Pakistan’s religious elite held the largest percentage of “strongly negative” 
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opinions, although they made up the second-smallest group within Pakistan’s elite. These 
elites were the only sect to not hold any positive views of the drone program. Such a response 
is largely due to the close relationship most religious leaders have with the community, as 
their opinions may be influenced by the impact drones have on civilian life. Pakistan’s 
military elite, however, had the largest concentration of “strongly positive” articles, which 
was once again due to the viewpoint that drone technology is effective but should be given to 
the Pakistani military. The “unknown” members of Pakistan’s elite held the largest share of 
“slightly positive” articles, indicating that these individuals may have been more willing than 
others to recognize the virtues of the drone program upon reflecting on the pros and cons of 
drone strikes. While all elite opinion was mostly “strongly negative” with regard to drone 
strikes, the responses toward America were somewhat more varied, as illustrated by Figure 
10.  
Figure 10. Pakistani Elite Opinion of America by Elite Group 
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As Figures 9 and 10 illustrate, Pakistan’s religious leaders contain the most “strongly 
negative” opinions of both America and drones, although they hold some “slightly positive” 
views of America. However, the other four groups of elites expressed greater positive 
sentiments toward America, particularly Pakistan’s business elite. Given that these 
individuals’ power is tied to their wealth, it is not hard to imagine that they have done some 
business in America, as it is the world’s largest economy. Having positive business relations 
in America would make it more likely for these individuals to view America more highly 
than would other members of Pakistan’s elite, as these businessmen are directly profiting 
from their relationship with America. Members of Pakistan’s military or political elite 
groups, however, held somewhat less positive views of America than did Pakistan’s business 
elite. These individuals likely have a close working relationship with members of the 
American government and military, which may not necessarily be a positive experience. The 
idea that America is violating Pakistan’s sovereignty by forcing the drone program upon it is 
shared by many of Pakistan’s military and political elite, as depicted in Figure 11. If this is 
indeed the situation and Pakistani elites are unwillingly complying with American policies, 
this would create quite a bit of tension for these members of Pakistani society. As Figure 11 
illustrates, though, there are many other factors influencing these groups’ opinions of 
America and drone strikes.  
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Figure 11. Influential Factors on Pakistani Elite Opinion by Elite Group 
  
 Figure 11 presents a breakdown of the influential factors based on the number of 
Pakistani elites who referenced these factors in the articles. As the largest elite group in the 
dataset, it is unsurprising that the political elite are highly represented in each factor. What is 
surprising about this particular group, however, is that they have the largest share of articles 
pertaining to the factor “Pakistani government.” As this factor is largely a complaint against 
the Pakistani government for allowing the drone program to occur, it is interesting that the 
factor is most widely cited by members of Pakistan’s government. While there were a few 
instances in which the same individual was being quoted in multiple articles, such as the 
well-known anti-drone politician Imran Khan, this indicates that there is some disconnect 
between Pakistan’s government as a whole and some of its individual members. However, it 
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may also be that some Pakistani politicians are attempting to curry local favor by outwardly 
denouncing the drone program and the Pakistani government, but are actually cooperating 
with the United States to carry out drone strikes.   
 The factors most cited by Pakistan’s religious, business, and military elites are not 
particularly surprising, but they are still interesting to discuss. For instance, “location” was 
the most significant factor for religious elites. The locations usually mentioned by the articles 
as being targets for strikes were mosques or meeting places for local tribal leaders (the 
majority of whom are devoutly religious), both of which are of strong significance for 
religious leaders. Attacks on these locations were often viewed by the religious elite as being 
direct attacks on Muslims, which indicates why this was a particularly important factor to 
them. Business leaders’ most cited factor was “property damage”; if these individuals owned 
a building that was destroyed by a strike, it makes logical sense that this would generate a 
response. Lastly, “militant casualties” was the most cited factor by Pakistan’s military elite. 
These individuals care a great deal about the effectiveness of the drone program, as killing 
militants is part of their profession. It is therefore unsurprising that military elites cited 
“militant casualties” far more times than did any other elite group. However, diplomatic 
context was a factor cited numerous times by all of the elite groups, indicating its overall 
importance, and is ultimately a particularly interesting factor that is discussed below.  
Diplomatic Context 
 While Figure 5 illustrates that only 7.1 percent of the articles contained some 
reference to United States-Pakistan relations outside of drone strikes, diplomatic context is 
still an important factor to examine in order to fully understand the two nations’ relationship 
at the time. Although the full chronology contained other events as well, the following 
timeline, Figure 12, depicts the events that were mentioned by at least three different 
newspapers and were cited in the articles pertaining to the factors and responses: 
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Figure 12. Timeline of U.S.-Pakistan Relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The majority of these events negatively impacted Pakistani opinion of either drones or 
of America, which is analyzed in greater detail later in this section. The following discussion 
outlines each of the five events in chronological order.   
 Aafia Siddiqui is a Pakistani woman who provided financial support for Al-Qaeda and 
had plans to commit an act of terror in the United States. After attempting to shoot members 
of the FBI and U.S. Army while in captivity on July 17, 2008, she was held in the United 
States to await a trial. On February 3, 2010 American jurors found her guilty of various 
charges, including attempted murder and armed assault. Her conviction was met with public 
outcry in Pakistan, as many Pakistanis viewed her as both innocent and a victim of abuse at 
the hands of the U.S. military. Even Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Gilani attempted to 
secure her release, but to no avail.  
 On May 15, 2010, the first drone strike in the Khyber region of Pakistan occurred. 
Many Pakistanis were upset that the drone program was becoming more expansive, as almost 
all of the previous drone attacks had occurred in North and South Waziristan. For many 
elites, this event was seen as the United States further encroaching on Pakistani sovereignty, 
leaving many embittered with the United States.  
 Pakistan experienced severe floods in late July of 2010 that affected approximately 20 
million Pakistanis. Almost 2,000 lives were lost, more than 1.89 million homes were 
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destroyed, and billions of dollars’ worth of damage was incurred. In the following months, 
the United States provided the greatest amount of aid to Pakistan of any country involved in 
the relief effort, supplying helicopters, rescue personnel, and millions of dollars (Singapore 
Red Cross 2010). While there was some criticism that the Pakistani government was slow to 
rescue minority groups and did not provide sufficient aid to low-income individuals, many 
Pakistanis seemed appreciative of the aid sent by the United States.  
 Cross-border attacks often occur when helicopters pursuing militants in Afghanistan 
cross into Pakistani airspace; such was the case on September 30, 2010. U.S.-led NATO 
helicopters, following a group of Afghani militants, unknowingly crossed into the Pakistani 
region Kurram. According to Pakistani officials, Pakistani border patrol agents fired warning 
shots at the helicopters, indicating that they had crossed into Pakistan. According to the 
United States and NATO, the soldiers were firing directly at the helicopters, and thus they 
returned fire. Ultimately, three Pakistani soldiers were killed and three others were wounded. 
In response to this attack, the Pakistani government temporarily closed NATO supply lines to 
Afghanistan, and many were incensed at both America and NATO (Roggio 2010). 
 The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, or the Kerry-Lugar Act, was 
signed into law on October 15, 2009. The Act allowed America to provide 1.5 billion dollars 
in non-military aid annually from 2010 to 2014 to Pakistan. While one purpose of the bill was 
to foster positive relations between the United States and Pakistan, some Pakistanis protested 
against the Act. One stipulation to receive the aid was that the Pakistani military would have 
to seek a more active role in targeting militants; many of Pakistan’s elites viewed this 
requirement as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, and did not want to accept the aid 
(Masood 2009, Shah 2010). However, Pakistani President Asif Zardari chose to receive the 
funds, leaving many Pakistanis particularly angry with their president.  
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 For the majority of these five events, as well as the other events that were mentioned 
in the articles, elite opinions of America and drones were largely negative. The relationship 
between each event and opinions of America and drones are presented in the following two 
graphs, Figures 13 and 14.  
Figure 13. Impact of Diplomatic Events on Elite Opinions of America 
 
 Figure 13 demonstrates elite opinions of America based on each of the events 
previously outlined. As the graph shows, most of the elite reactions were “strongly negative.” 
However, the aid the U.S. provided for flood relief was largely met with positive reactions, 
and thus during this time there was a small lessening of anti-American sentiments. The 
Kerry-Lugar Act also experienced some positive reactions, which were expressed by 
individuals who either valued U.S. monetary aid or appreciated the fact that accepting the aid 
meant Pakistan would have to take a stronger stance against terrorists. However, as Figure 14 
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demonstrates, the presence of drone strikes during these events was met with almost 
unanimously negative reactions. 
Figure 14. Impact of Diplomatic Events on Elite Opinions of Drones 
 
 When compared to Figure 13, it becomes quite clear that positive attitudes toward 
America do not equate to positive attitudes toward drones. Due to the fact that drone strikes 
were occurring at the time of these largely negative events, Pakistani elite opinion of drones 
was further soured. The reactions of elites at the time of U.S. flood relief are particularly 
interesting, as there are very few positive reactions. Many of the articles expressed anger that 
although the United States was providing useful aid, the drone program was still being 
carried out and taking a further toll on Pakistani lives. In totality, diplomatic context had a 
largely negative effect on elite opinions of drones.  
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Limitations 
 Due to my methodology, I cannot establish any statistically significant correlations 
between the factors and responses, as I have no way of accurately determining whether or not 
one particular factor directly impacted an opinion while controlling for the other factors. 
Additionally, my dataset is comprised of mostly conservative Pakistani newspapers, which 
may have caused my data to be somewhat skewed. This may have presented itself as an 
overestimation in the number of negative opinions of America or the drone program, as these 
attitudes are most closely associated with conservative opinions in Pakistan.  
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Conclusion 
Policy Implications 
Unfortunately, there are few measures the United States can take to reduce these 
angry sentiments. The data suggest that the only options that would be successful in 
achieving this would be to either stop the drone program completely or to transfer the drone 
technology to Pakistan’s military. However, neither of these are viable options, as the United 
States government and military highly value the drone program for its success in killing 
militants. Furthermore, as drone technology has become more precise, the number of civilian 
deaths has steadily declined, which has made the drone program seem even more favorable 
than, for example, sending in ground troops.  
Points for Further Research 
One point for further research is a deeper examination of militant casualties and elite 
opinions of those casualties. It would be interesting to determine whether or not elite opinions 
change depending on which terrorist organization is being targeted. For example, if the target 
is a foreign militant, elites might feel less strongly than they would if the target was a 
Pakistani. Another item worth researching is how the United States weighs the costs and 
benefits of engendering ill-will. The United States government is well aware of the fact that 
the drone program is not viewed favorably by the Pakistani people, yet it continues to utilize 
drone strikes. It would be interesting to discover at what point the United States would be 
willing to stop the drone program; such a discovery might assist Pakistani elites in their 
attempts to halt the program. Alternatively, it could be useful to examine whether there are 
additional measures not mentioned in this paper that the United States could take to alleviate 
Pakistani hostility to the drone program.  
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Summary of Findings 
 The United States drone program in Pakistan in 2010 was largely met with criticism 
by Pakistan’s elites, although there were some proponents of the program. Opinion of 
America at this time was also extremely negative, and the most significant factor that 
impacted opinions of both America and drones was civilian casualties. Additional influencing 
factors that were predominant at the time include the violation of Pakistani sovereignty, the 
frequency with which attacks occurred, and general discontent with the Pakistani government 
for allowing the attacks to occur. 
 Responses toward America and the drone program varied by the members of 
Pakistan’s elite. The four main groups of elites—businessmen, politicians, military officials, 
and religious leaders—held differing primary concerns with regard to drone strikes and 
America. Pakistan’s business elite expressed opinions regarding the property damage drone 
strikes cause, whereas religious leaders were primarily concerned with the actual location of 
the drone strike. Politicians denounced their own government for its involvement in the drone 
program, while military officials were focused on the effectiveness of the drone program in 
targeting militants. However, even with these differences in opinion, civilian casualties were 
a major concern for all of Pakistan’s elite.  
 The diplomatic context surrounding a particular drone strike also had some effect on 
elite opinions, albeit largely negative. Five events were particularly impactful: the conviction 
of Aafia Siddiqui, the first drone attack in the Khyber region of Pakistan, the provision of 
flood relief by the United States, a cross-border attack by NATO forces that killed three 
Pakistani soldiers, and the distribution of funds via the Kerry-Lugar Act. With the exception 
of the flood relief received from the United States, these events resulted in strongly negative 
opinions of the United States. The events also negatively influenced opinions of the drone 
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program, as the simultaneous occurrence of these events and drone strikes aggravated 
Pakistani hostility.   
In totality, the United States drone program in 2010, while seemingly successful in 
terms of targeting militants, was not met positively by Pakistan’s elite, and may have further 
strained America’s relationship with Pakistan. 
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Appendix A 
Map of Pakistan 
The following is a map of Pakistan that clearly demarcates the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas. American drone strikes in Pakistan in 2010 only took place in 
FATA, and as the map illustrates, FATA is directly adjacent to the Afghanistan border. This 
has allowed many members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban to carry out terrorist operations in 
Pakistan. 
 
(Muslim Issue 2014). 
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Map of Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
This map depicts the regions that comprise FATA. With the exception of one strike in 
Kurram and five strikes in Khyber, the majority of strikes in 2010 occurred in North and 
South Waziristan.  
 
(Phillips and Curtis 2008).   
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Appendix B 
Breakdown of Newspapers 
 The following table lists information pertaining to each of the seven newspapers 
utilized in the data.  
Table D. Breakdown of Newspapers 
Newspaper Language  Characteristics Locations Circulation 
Jang Urdu  Moderate; 
politically 
neutral 
Rawalpindi, Lahore, 
Rawalpindi 
850,000 
Jasarat Urdu  Conservative; 
owned by the 
Islamic political 
party Jamaat-e 
Islami  
Karachi, Lahore, 
Islamabad 
50,000 
The Nation English Conservative; 
owned by the 
Nawa-e Waqt 
group 
Lahore, Karachi, and 
Islamabad 
120,000 
Nawa-e Waqt Urdu Conservative; 
Islamic 
Islamabad/Rawalpindi, 
Lahore, Karachi, 
Multan 
500,000 
The News 
International 
English Moderate; owned 
by the Jang 
group 
Karachi, Lahore, 
Islamabad/Rawalpindi 
140,000 
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Khabrain Urdu Conservative; 
has access to 
government and 
military sources 
Islamabad, Karachi, 
Lahore, Peshawar, 
Multan, Haiderabad, 
Muzaffarabad, Sukkar 
232,000 
Pakistan 
Observer 
Online 
English Pro-military  Islamabad, Karachi, 
Lahore, Peshawar, 
Muzaffarabad, Quetta 
5,000 
 
Sample of Factors and Responses Dataset 
The following is a sample of my factors and responses dataset; additional information 
not shown below includes the date of the article, the date of the event being written about (if 
any), the name of the newspaper, the URL of the article, the date the article was coded, and 
any additional notes. For ease of understanding how much information pertains to a certain 
article, each article and its corresponding factors and responses are color-coded.  
Table A: Factors and Responses Dataset (Sample) 
Summary of Article Elite Factors  Elite Responses 
White House spokesperson said the US would respect 
the sovereignty of Yemen the same way it respected 
the sovereignty of Pakistan; author vehemently 
disagrees with the notion that Pakistani sovereignty has 
been respected and believes this statement means 
Yemen's sovereignty is also under threat; says a drone 
attack occurred on the same day as the spokesperson's 
statement; author states the president and prime 
minister of Pakistan have said that drone attacks cause 
problems for the Pakistani government; a better 
solution would be to transfer drone technology to 
Pakistan; Pakistani Parliament passed resolution 
Violation of sovereignty; 
transference of drone technology 
Strongly negative US; 
slightly positive drones  
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against US drone strikes but nothing has changed; John 
McCain issued a statement saying the strikes are useful 
and effective, but the author does not seem to agree; 
author argues that US is defining sovereignty as having 
to do with land borders and not airspace; also angry at 
US use of Black Water/XE 
Pakistani Parliament's special committee condemned 
drone attacks in FATA; stated the attacks violate 
Pakistan's sovereignty and urged the government to 
take strict measures to stop these attacks and summon 
the US ambassador to Foreign Office and register 
protest against US drone attacks; special committee 
plans to play its role with the government to stop the 
attacks from happening; "Mian Raza Rabbani said that 
the special committee expressed grave concern 
regarding new US immigration policy under which 
strict body search of Pakistani citizens at US airports 
would be carried out, which was against the declaration 
of human rights. He said that the committee had asked 
the government to raise this issue on diplomatic level 
and compel the United States to review its policy." 
Violation of Pakistani 
sovereignty; violation of Pakistani 
human rights due to US 
immigration policy (diplomatic 
context) 
Strongly negative US; 
strongly negative drones 
Pakistani president and local tribesmen in Waziristan 
say that the civilian population is mostly the target of 
the drone attacks, resulting in anti-American feelings in 
the tribal areas; President Zardari met with a visiting 
US Congress delegation and said the drone attacks are 
harmful to the national consensus against terrorism in 
Pakistan, and that the US should give Pakistan drone 
technology; US officials continue to defend the drone 
Civilian casualties; local 
reactions; transference of drone 
technology; diplomatic context 
Strongly negative US; 
slightly positive drones  
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program; McCain said the US military is heading to the 
Afghanistan border and is coordinating with the 
Pakistani military; the CIA in Khost, Afghanistan was 
attacked and some CIA members were killed, and thus 
the US is increasing pressure to launch an operation in 
North Waziristan, which the author sees as the US 
seeking revenge by using drone strikes 
Two drones fired at a religious seminary and a house in 
the Pasalkot area of North Waziristan; reports that 10 
were killed and numerous others were injured; 
eyewitnesses said the drones were hovering over the 
area for a long time before the strikes occurred; a 
political official said all those killed were extremists, 
and some may have been foreigners; he also said that a 
top Taliban leader had been the primary target; people 
fled from their homes in a panic after the attack 
occurred; there are conflicting reports by local sources 
and the Taliban as to whether or not Taliban leader 
Hakimullah Mehsud escaped or was killed  
Destruction of property; spread of 
panic; location; militant casualties 
Neutral US; neutral 
drones 
Security sources confirmed that Tehreek-e-Taliban 
Punjab leader Ismatullah Muaavia was killed by a 
strike in Shaktoi; he was the mastermind of many 
terrorist attacks across the country; two other militant 
companions also killed 
Militant casualties  Neutral US; neutral 
drones 
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain (president of Pakistan 
Muslim League-Qaid PML-Q) has said that the 
government has issued a no-objection certificate 
(NOC) on drone attacks and that the public is being 
deceived.  
Pakistani government's allowance 
of drone strikes  
Strongly negative US; 
strongly negative drones 
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The Pakistani military successfully tests shooting down 
US drones; "Commander Lt Gen Salim reviewed 
Pakistan's air defense and felt highly jubilant over 
shooting down drones. He expressed determination to 
continue such tests for the defense of the country." 
Public opinion was support for these tests; because the 
military is not shooting down actual drones, the 
military considers their operations to be a diplomatic 
effort with the United States; analyst Shirin Mazari 
says the tests are political stunts and that the 
government is secretly supportive of the strikes and 
deceives its people and that the strikes have been going 
on for too long  
Local reactions; Pakistani 
government's allowance of drone 
strikes 
Strongly negative US; 
strongly negative drones 
Demonstration on shooting down drones at the annual 
exercise of the Pakistan Army Air Defense in the 
Muzaffargarh flying range; suicide bombers have been 
attacking because of drone strikes; suicide attacks 
increase when civilians die; the US expresses its 
condolences over civilian deaths; drones should be shot 
down 
Civilian casualties; suicide attacks 
in response to drone strikes; 
Pakistani government's allowance 
of drone strikes 
Strongly negative US; 
strongly negative drones 
The US is attacking Pakistan's nuclear assets; defense 
minister does not see a way to stop drone attacks from 
occurring because the US will not have a dialogue with 
the Pakistani government about it; the Pakistani media 
is not covering the strikes and is therefore letting 
civilians die because they are not expressing outrage 
over the attacks and demanding accountability by the 
US; the military should be shooting down drones 
because Pakistan's parliament said drones would not be 
tolerated in the region; US special envoy Richard 
Holbrooke said Pakistan and India must resolve their 
disputes themselves; the US and the Taliban should 
settle matters on their own and leave Pakistan out of 
Civilian casualties; violation of 
Pakistani sovereignty; Pakistani 
government's allowance of drone 
strikes; diplomatic context 
Strongly negative US; 
strongly negative drones 
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their war; the US needs to respect Pakistan's 
sovereignty 
Babur Khan Ghauri (federal minister for ports and 
shipping and leader of the Muttahida Qaumi 
Movement) said the presence of Taliban leaders in 
Karachi has increased the threat of drone attacks in 
Karachi; he is thankful that Karachi was spared from a 
major Taliban attack when suicide bombers' jackets 
killed them preemptively  
Militant casualties Neutral US; slightly 
negative drones 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
References 
“America’s Image Remains Poor: Concern about Extremist Threat Slips in Pakistan.” Pew 
 Research Center Global Attitudes Project, 2010. Web. 19 Mar. 2014.  
“Attitudes toward the United States.” Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project, 2013. 
 Web. 11 Nov. 2014.  
Bergen, Peter and Katherine Tiedemann. “About the Drone Data.” pakistansurvey.org. New 
 America Foundation, 2010. Web. 19 Mar. 2014.  
Bergen, Peter and Katherine Tiedemann. “The Drone War.” newamerica.net. New America 
 Foundation, 2009. Web. 4 Apr. 2014. 
Chiozza, Giacomo. Anti-Americanism and the American World Order. Baltimore: The Johns 
 Hopkins University Press, 2009. Print.  
“Do Pakistanis Support U.S. Drone Attacks?” NPR Oct. 25 2013. Web. 20 Mar. 2014.   
“Drone Wars Methodology.” natsec.newamerica.net. National Security Program, New 
 America Foundation. Web. 1 Apr. 2014. 
“Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis.” natsec.newamerica.net. National Security Program, New 
 America Foundation. Web. 19 Oct. 2014.  
“Drones Over Pakistan: Drop the Pilot.” The Economist Oct. 19 2013. Web. 20 Mar. 2014.  
Fair, C. Christine. “The Militant Challenge in Pakistan.” Asia Policy Number 11 (January 
 2011): 105-137. Print. 
Fair, C. Christine, Karl C. Kaltenthaler, and William J. Millerjan. “Pakistani Opposition to 
 American Drone Strikes.” Political Science Quarterly 129.1 (2014): 1-33. Web. 10 
 June 2014. 
Fair, C. Christine, Karl C. Kaltenthaler, and William J. Miller. “You Say Pakistanis All 
 Hate the Drone War? Prove It.” The Atlantic Jan. 23 2013. Web. 18 Mar. 2014.  
56 
 
Gould, Carol. Don’t Tread on Me: Anti-Americanism Abroad. New York: Encounter Books, 
 2009. Print. 
“Global Education Digest 2009: Comparing Education Statistics Across the World.” 
 unesco.org. Institute for Statistics, UNESCO, 2009. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. 
“Income Share Held by the Highest 10%.” theworldbank.org. World DataBank, The World 
 Bank. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. 
Kaltenthaler, Karl C., William J. Miller, and Christine Fair. “The Drone War: Pakistani 
 Public Attitudes toward American Drone Strikes in Pakistan.” Annual Meetings of the 
 Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, IL. 13-17 April 2012. Prepared 
 presentation paper. 
Katzenstein, Peter J. and Robert O. Keohane. Anti-Americanisms in World Politics. Ithaca: 
 Cornell University Press, 2007. Print. 
“Labor Force Participation Rate, Female.” theworldbank.org. World DataBank, The World 
 Bank, 2014. Web. 11 Nov. 2014.  
Lewis, Larry. “Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Reasons to Assess Civilian Casualties.” Center for 
 Naval Analyses, 2014. Web. 19 Apr. 2014. 
“Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in 
 Pakistan.” livingunderdrones.org. Stanford Law School International Human Rights 
 and Conflict Resolution Clinic and NYU School of Law Global Justice Clinic, 2012. 
 Web. 18 Mar. 2014.   
Markey, Daniel S. No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad. 
 New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Print.  
Masood, Salman. “Pakistanis View U.S. Aid Warily.” thenewyorktimes. Blogs, The New 
 York Times, 2009. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. 
57 
 
Mazzetti, Mark. The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the 
 Earth. New York: The Penguin Press, 2013. Print. 
Milam, William B. and Matthew J. Nelson. “Pakistan’s Populist Foreign Policy.” Survival: 
 Global Politics and Strategy 55.1 (2013): 121-134. Print.  
“Pakistan.” cia.gov. World Factbook, CIA, 20 June 2014. Web. 7 Mar. 2014.  
“Pakistan Floods: The Deluge of Disaster- Facts and Figures as of 15 September, 2010.” 
 reliefweb.int. Singapore Red Cross, Relief Web, 2010. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. 
“Pakistan Newsprint.” audiencescapes.org. InterMedia Knowledge Center, 2010. Web. 9 
 Sept. 2014.  
“Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S.” Pew Research Center Global Attitudes 
 Project, 2012. Web. 15 Apr. 2014. 
Paracha, Sajjad Ahmed, Fatima Imran, and Muhammad Ashraf Khan. “Framing of Drone 
 Attacks in Pakistani Elite Press: A Comparative Study of Dawn and the Nation.” 
 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 3.1 (2012): 471-482. Web. 17 Oct. 2014.  
Phillips, James and Lisa Curtis. “The War in Afghanistan: More Help Needed.” heritage.org. 
 The Heritage Foundation, 17 Apr. 2008. Web. 20 Oct. 2014.  
Roggio, Bill. “Pakistan Closes NATO Supply Route After Latest US Cross-Border Attack.” 
 longwarjournal.org. The Long War Journal, 2010. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. 
“Saudi Arabia and Qatar begin Recruitment of Soldiers from Pakistani Jihadi Belt of FATA.” 
 themuslimissue.wordpress.com. 15 Apr. 2014. Web. 20 Oct. 2014.  
Sciutto, Jim. Against Us: The New Face of America’s Enemies in the Muslim World. New 
 York: Harmony Books, 2008. Print. 
Shah, Saeed. “U.S. to Unveil Large Aid Package to Win the Hearts of Pakistanis.” 
 mcclatchydc.com. McClatchy Newspapers, 2010. Web. 11 Nov. 2014. 
